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Few concepts are more fundamental to American democracy 
than the impartiality of the judicial branch of the government. One 
recited in the Declaration of Independence was that King George III 
1  The means of this 
dependency  
2  were explicitly 
addressed in Article III of the Constitution.3 But, life tenure and a 
guaranteed salary, while reasonable and perhaps necessary, are 
insufficient to protect against judicial bias. 
Among the most important judge-made rules to increase the 
odds of impartiality in decision making is the doctrine of stare decisis.  
The tendency to make arbitrary decisions is reduced when a court is 
required to honor established judicial decisions. Of course, the 
doctrine requires that, before a decision is made, existing precedent 
is identified, addressed and, unless overturned for well-documented 
reasons, followed. 
This article explores two related decisions, M&G Polymers USA, 
LLC v. Tackett4 and CNH Industrial, LLC v. Reese,5 where the Supreme 
Court ignored long-standing precedent and adopted and applied 
contrary legal standards. The specific issue was the legal standard 
for determining the contractual rights of retirees with collectively 
bargained healthcare benefits.6 While the context was not one with 
Constitutional implications, at least on its face, the overriding issue 
of maintenance of judicial impartiality was implicated. The fact that, 
as a result of the decisions, tens of thousands of retirees lost or will 
lose their healthcare benefits,7 is a minor loss compared to the 
damage done if the Supreme Court can bypass the requirements of 
stare decisis by simply refusing to acknowledge  and in the process 
disregarding  the holdings of, and the policies underlying, its earlier 
decisions. 
 
1.   THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2, 11 (U.S. 1776).  
2.   Id. at para. 11.  
3.   U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
4.   M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015).  
5.   CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).  
6.   Id. at 762-63.  
7.   Id. at 764.  
of the "injuries and usurpations" tending to "absolute Tyranny'' 
had "made Judges dependent on his will alone." 
-the King's control over the "tenure of their offices" and 
"the amount and payment of their salaries" -
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING IMPARTIAL 
 A. Constitutional Implications 
The possibility that justice would be perverted by the rich and 
powerful was a fundamental concern of the Founding Fathers. 
According to John Locke, a major source for their political 
philosophy, a person who abandons the law of nature for the benefits 
of political society, also abandons the law of personal justice.8 The 
primary function of political society is to serve as the arbiter of 
disputes that arise among society
personal rights. In this context, justice must be administered so that 
society understands that the government treats all citizens equally 
and poor, for the favorite at court, and for the country man at 
9 
independence from Great Britain, accused King George III of a 
object the est 10 
Administration of Justice by refusing his Assent to Laws for the 
establishing Judiciary powers. He has made Judges dependent on his 
Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and 
11 
These concerns  that the new federal government would make 
judges dependent on its will alone, thus supplanting the British 
sovereign so recently deposed  were directly addressed in Article 
III of the United States Constitution. Section I of Article III provides, 
in its entirety: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The 
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated 
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in 
 
8.   JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 342-44 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.). 
9.   Id. at 381. 
10.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).   
11.  Id. at para. 10, 11.  
's members over competing 
under the law. Or, as Locke stated: there must be "one rule for rich 
plough." 
The "thirteen united States of America" in declaring their 
"history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct 
ablishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States." 
Among these usurpations was that King George "has obstructed the 
payment of their salaries." 
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Office.12 
Article III does not require that federal judges be impartial. 
Instead, the two expressed requirements, lifetime tenure and 
undiminished compensation, were intended to make the judiciary 
independent of both the President and the Congress, ensuring that 
judges would be, if they so choose, free from the pressures of 
temporal political forces and thereby more likely to be impartial. 
In The Federalist Papers No. 78, Alexander Hamilton wrote that 
force nor will, but merely judgment . . 13  
Judicial authority can come only from public perception of the 
14 of the courts. Without that perception, 
foundations of public and private confidence, and . . . introduc[ing] 
15 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania. v. Casey,16 the 
of the Judiciary as fit to determine wh
17 
Former Justice Kennedy reiterated that fundamental theme in 
New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres:18 
is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary 
respected for its independence, its professional attainments, and the 
19 According to the Seventh Circuit in 
Bauer v. Shepard20
impartiality; it is public acceptance, rather than the sword or the 
purse, that leads decisions to be obeyed and averts vigilantism and 
21 
 
12.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
13.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
14.  Id. at 470.  
15.  Id. 
16.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See also Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ( The power and 
the prerogative of a court . . . rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. ). 
17.  Id. at 865. See also Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ( The power and the prerogative of a court . . . rest, in the end, 
upon the respect accorded to its judgments. ). 
18.  N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008).  
19.  Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J. concurring).   
20.  Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010). 
21.  Id. at 712. 
courts possess "neither II 
"integrity and moderation" 
Hamilton wrote, the rule of law is undermined, "sap[ping] the 
in its stead universal distrust and distress." 
Court said that, because a court cannot generally "coerce obedience 
to its decrees," its "power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of 
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance 
at the Nation's law means and 
to declare what it demands." 
"The rule of law, which 
absolute probity of its judges." 
: "The judicial system depends on its reputation for 
civil strife." 
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These lofty statements declare an aspiration rather than a 
reality. Judicial independence and impartiality are ideals, not 
foregone conclusions. Given the multiple factors involved in most 
decisions, and the fact that all appellate decisions require the 
concurrence of more than one judge, judicial impartiality is an 
abstraction which cannot easily be objectively measured. And, 
because the judicial system seldom directly affects ordinary citizens, 
whether and when the ideal approaches the reality is something that 
most citizens rarely consider, or if they consider it, often cannot 
possibly fathom. It is thus important that any departures from the 
ideal be brought to light and carefully examined. 
While litigants have a Constitutional right to an impartial court, 
that right comes, not from Section III, but from the Due Process 
Clause.22  . . 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
23 In In re Murchison,24 
25 
The standard for judicial impartiality under the Due Process 
Clause is an objective one that does not require a showing of actual 
f actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of 
26 In Coley v. Bagley,27 
when actual and when merely unconstitutionally probable, if either 
type of judicial bias is proven, Strickland prejudice need not be 
28 
In practice, judges decide claims of bias and judges have proven 
impartial judiciary. The presumption is, and probably must be, that 
judges will act impartially regardless of their personal ideology. 
 
22.   U.S. CONST. amend V. Nothing in Article III requires judicial impartiality. In fact, the 
right to lifetime tenure makes it much more difficult to remove a judge who proves, after 
appointment, to be biased in decision making.  
23.  Id.   
24.  In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).  
25.  Id. at 136.  
26.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883-84 (2009) (quoting Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).  
27.   Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2013). 
28.   Id. at 750 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984) (internal citations 
omitted)).  
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall.
law." the Supreme Court held that "[a] fair trial 
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." 
bias. Instead, "[i]n defining these standards the Court has asked 
whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and 
human weakness,' the interest 'poses such a risk o 
due process is to be adequately implemented.111 
the Sixth Circuit stated "[s]ince judicial bias is a structural defect both 
proven." 
reluctant guardians of the people's right to an independent, 
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integrity. Judges judging themselves undoubtedly most often believe 
they are unbiased or that they can decide cases fairly despite 
personal beliefs.  Judges judging other judges bend over backward 
not to do so, based on concerns of collegiality or that they too will 
appear biased in their assessment. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause 
requires recusal of judges only in extraordinary circumstances, a 
point well illustrated by the facts of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.29 
There, Massey Coal had appealed a $50 million adverse jury verdict 
to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.30 While the appeal 
was pending, the CEO of Massey Coal contributed $3 million to 
replace an incumbent on the Supreme Court with an attorney more 
sympathetic to its position.31 
he refused to recuse himself and, in fact, became the deciding vote in 
reversing the judgment against his benefactor.32 A bare majority of 
the United States Supreme Court concluded that, under these 
33 
 B. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
Litigants are not solely dependent on the Due Process clause to 
protect them from arbitrary judicial decision-making. Courts, 
through rules and common law decisions, have established certain 
prudential standards intended to reduce judicial bias. Perhaps the 
best known of these is the doctrine of stare decisis stare 
decisis stare decisis et non 
quieta movere
34 Stare decisis is the age old common law policy that 
courts should adhere to principles of law developed and decided in 
their earlier decisions. 
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,35 the Court described stare 
decisis 36 and as a 
 
29.   Caperton, 556 U.S. 868.  
30.  Id. at 874. 
31.  Id. at 884.  
32.  Id. at 875.  
33.  Id. at 871.  
34.   GABRIEL ADELEYE & KOFI ACQUAH-DADZIE, WORLD DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN 
EXPRESSIONS: A RESOURCE FOR READERS AND WRITERS 371 (Thomas J. Sienkewicz & James 
T. McDonough, Jr. eds., 1999).  
35.  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
36.  Id. at 172 (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep t of Highways & Pub. Tr., 483 U.S. 468, 494 
Challenges based on perceived bias implicate a judge's personal 
After Massey's candidate was elected, 
circumstances, the Due Process Clause required the judge's recusal . 
. The words " 
" is a shortened form of the Latin maxim " 
" which means "to stand by decisions and not disturb 
the undisturbed." 
as "of fundamental importance to the rule of law" 
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c, self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is 
entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and 
37 Justice Benjamin Cardozo referred to stare decisis as the 
38  Concurring in Hubbard v. 
United States,39 Justice Scalia stated: 
The doctrine of stare decisis protects the legitimate 
expectations of those who live under the law, and, as 
Alexander Hamilton observed, is one of the means by 
restrained, The Federalist No. 78, p. 471 (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961). Who ignores it must give reasons, and reasons that 
go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opinion 
was wrong (otherwise the doctrine would be no doctrine at 
all).40 
In his concurrence in County of Allegheny v. American Civil 
Liberties Union,41 
principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings 
of our prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules 
42 
Stare decisis is a principle of policy, not an inexorable 
command.43 stare decisis are at their acme 
in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance 
44 The policy also has special force with 
regard to questions of statutory interpretation.45 It has least force in 
cases involving procedural rules implicating fundamental 
Constitutional protections.46 Relevant factors as to whether to follow 
 
(1987)).  
37.   Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, see CBOCS 
West, Inc. v. Humphrey, 553 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). 
38.   BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1921).  
39.   Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995).  
40.   Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
41.   County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).  
42.   Id. at 664 (Kennedy, J. concurring).  
43.   Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991), reh g denied, 501 U.S. 1277 (1991).   
44.   Id.   
45.   Kurns v. R.R. Friction Products Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 641 (2012). 
46.   Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 119 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
''basi 
preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based on 'an arbitrary 
discretion.111 
"every day working rule of our law." 
which exercise of "an arbitrary discretion in the courts" is 
Justice Kennedy stated: "As a general rule, the 
of law." 
"Considerations in favor of 
interests are involved." 
or change existing precedent include the "antiquity of the precedent, 
the reliance interests at stake," and whether the precedent was well 
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reasoned.47 
Of course, for stare decisis to be an effective safeguard against an 
arbitrary judiciary, existing precedent must first be identified. But, in 
both Tackett48 and Reese,49 the Supreme Court simply ignored its long-
standing precedent on precisely what constitutes a collective 
bargaining agreement. Absent consideration and understanding of 
this critical issue, and the underlying federal labor policy on which 
it is based, it was impossible for the Court to determine the 
appropriate interpretive standards to be applied to the CBAs at issue 
in those cases. The result is that there are now two diametrically 
opposed lines of Supreme Court precedent on the issues of collective 
bargaining agreements and the interpretative rules that apply to 
them  one from before Tackett and one after Tackett. 
III. AFTER TACKETT  CBAS UST BE INTERPRETED CCORDING 
TO ORDINARY PRINCIPALS OF CONTRACT LAW  
A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is an agreement 
between an employer and a labor organization selected by the 
employees to represent them in (collective) bargaining. As noted in 
more detail below, CBAs are governed by federal law. Section 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, provides federal jurisdiction 
for their enforcement.50 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, industrial unions and private sector 
employers negotiated employer-paid healthcare benefits for retired 
employees and their spouses.51 
the issue of 
instead limited to the duration of the CBA, was the subject of 
increasing litigation.52 In 2015, the Supreme Court decided M&G 
 
47.   Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm n, 558 U.S. 310, 362-3 (2010) (quoting Montejo 
v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-793 (2009)). 
48.   M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015).  
49.   CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2018).  
50.   29 U.S.C. §185 (2012).  
51.   See, e.g., Cole v Meritor, Inc., 855 F.3d 695, 697 (6th Cir. 2017); Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. 
Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2006); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 954 F. Supp. 
1173, 1178 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Fox v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 653, 678 (E.D. Mich. 
1995). 
52.   See, e.g., Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1989); United Steelworkers 
v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1988); Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. 
UAW (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1986); Local Union No. 
150-A, UFCW v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1985); Bower v. Bunker 
Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984); UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 
"M 'A 
Ill 
Thereafter, beginning in the 1980's, 
whether these benefits "vest," that is, were intended by 
the parties to the CBA to last for the retiree's "lifetime" or were 
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Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett53 to resolve a perceived conflict in the 
Circuits that had developed over the preceding thirty years. 
 A. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett  
In Tackett,54 the particular question was the soundness of the 
long-maligned inference of vesting adopted in 1983 by the Sixth 
Circuit in UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc.55 
In Yard-Man,56 the Sixth Circuit initially stated that ordinary 
principles of contract interpretation apply to CBAs, to the extent 
consistent with federal labor policies.57 The court then identified 
common law contract principles it considered relevant.58  Applying 
those principles to the terms of the CBA, the court concluded that 
retiree healthcare benefits vested.59 The court then addressed 
particular the legal fact that retiree healthcare is a permissive, not 
mandatory, subject of bargaining.60 In this context, the court 
ikely that such benefits, which are typically 
understood as a form of delayed compensation or reward for past 
61 
Yard-Man 
nefits which, as such, carry with them an inference that 
62  The 
court cautioned that no federal labor policy presumptively favors the 
re of such 
 . . would be insufficient to find an intent to create 
63 
Over the years, the Sixth Circuit repeatedly addressed, defined 
and narrowed the app Yard-Man 
Circuit did so in conflicting terms, as indicated by the fact that one 
 
(6th Cir. 1983).  
53.   M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015).  
54.  Id.  
55.  Id. at 430.  
56.  Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476.  
57.  Id. at 1479. 
58.  Id. at 1479-81. 
59.  Id. at 1482. 
60.  Id.  
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. 
additional "contextual" factors connected to collective bargaining, in 
concluded that "it is unl 
service, would be left to the contingencies of future negotiations." 
then stated: "Further, retiree benefits are in a sense 
'status' be 
they continue so long as the prerequisite status is maintained." 
vesting of retiree healthcare benefits and that the "natu 
benefits simply provides another inference of intent," which 
"[ s ]tanding alone .
interminable benefits." 
lication of the " inference." The Sixth 
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judge characterized the inference as being either a disguised 
64 
a nud 65 
In Tackett, the Court rejected not only the Yard-Man 
inference but the entire body of Sixth Circuit law assessing 
collectively-bargained healthcare benefits as being contrary to 
66 After a discussion of ERISA,67 
-bargaining 
agreements, including those establishing ERISA plans, according to 
ordinary principles of contract law, at least when those principles are 
68 
While Tackett held that the Yard-Man inference was (wrongly) 
not stop there.69 Tackett criticized Yard-Man
application of the illusory promises rule.70 It held that, post-Yard-
Man, the Sixth Circuit had refused to give any weight to provisions 
that supported a contrary conclusion, such as a general termination 
clause.71 Tackett -Yard-Man decisions 
ty for health care benefits to receipt 
72  
In particular, Tackett criticized Noe v. PolyOne Corp.,73 where the Sixth 
Circuit held that a provision that ties eligibility for retiree healthcare 
74 
Tackett 
initial matter, Yard-Man violates ordinary contract principles by placing 
a thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all 
 
64.   Noe v. PolyOne, Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 568 (6th Cir. 2008) (Sutton, J., dissenting) ( what 
we continually disclaim presuming we continually seem to presume ). 
 65.  Reese v. CNH America, LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2009).  
66.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435.   
67.   Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. (2012).  
68.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435 (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 
448, 456-57 (1957)). 
69.   Id. at 438 (quoting Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482).  
70.  Id.  
71.   Id. at 934-35 (citing Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 1985)).  
72.   Id. at 937.  
73.   Id. at 936. 
74.   Noe v. PolyOne, 520 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting McCoy v. Meridian Auto. 
Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2004)).  
"presumption" or, in a subsequent case, as "nothing more than this: 
ge in favor of vesting in close cases." 
"status" 
"ordinary principles of contract law." 
the Court stated that: "We interpret collective 
not inconsistent with federal labor policy." 
gleaned from the "' context' of labor negotiations" and from the 
"status" of retirement benefits, rather than from the CBA itself, it did 
criticized the Sixth Circuit's post 
holding that "the tying of eligibili 
's "purported" 
of pension benefits suggested an intent to vest healthcare benefits." 
benefits to a pension leaves "little room for debate that retirees' 
health benefits vest upon retirement." 
could not have been more insistent that "ordinary" 
contract principles must govern the interpretation of CBAs: "As an 
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collective-bargaining agreements. That rule has no basis in ordinary 
principles of contract law 75 
Tackett nces applied in Yard-Man and 
its progeny represent ordinary principles of contract law 76 Citing Story 
and Williston, Tackett held that Sixth Circuit decisions requiring a 
durational clause specific to retiree benefits to prevent vesting 
the principle of 
contract law that the written agreement is presumed to encompass the 
77 
Tackett cited Co
other traditional principles of contract law, including the illusory 
 traditional 
principle that courts should not construe ambiguous writings to 
create life 78 Tackett 
treatment of collectively bargained and non-collectively bargained 
retiree healthcare benefits.79 The Sixth Circuit had held that, for non-
collectively bargained benefits to vest, the intent of the parties to be 
80 From this, Tackett 
employment contracts only underscores Yard Man
ordinary principles of contract law 81 
Tackett held th 82 was tainted by 
Yard-Man and its progeny.83 Yard-Man 
inferences as inconsistent with ordinary principles of contract law 84 
ordinary 
principles of contract law 85 
Justice Ginsberg, writing the four-justice concurrence, agreed 
ordinary contract principles, shorn of presumptions
ordinary 86 
 
75.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 438 (emphasis added). 
76.   Id. (emphasis added). 
77.   Id. at 440 (emphasis added) (citing 1 W. Story, Law of Contracts § 780 (M. Bigelow ed., 
5th ed. 1874) and 11 Williston § 31:5).  
78.   Id. (emphasis added) (citing 3 Williston § 7.7 (4th ed. 2008); 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 553, p. 216 (1960)). 
79.   Id. at 441.  
80.   Id.  (quoting Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 400 (6th Cir. 1998). 
81.   Id. (emphasis added). 
82.   M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 733 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2013). 
83.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 442.  
84.   Id. (emphasis added). 
85.   Id. (emphasis added). 
86.   Id. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
II 
disagreed that the "infere 
"distort the text of the agreement and conflict with 
whole agreement of the parties." 
II 
rbin to show that the Sixth Circuit "misapplied 
promises doctrine" and "failed even to consider the
time promises." noted the Sixth Circuit's differing 
"stated in clear and express language." 
concluded: "The different treatment of these two types of 
's deviation from 
II 
at the Sixth Circuit's decision 
It stated: "We reject the 
But, the Court remanded the case for the "court to apply 
in the first instance." 
II 
that II 
CBAs, citing other portions of Williston for those " 
," apply to 
"rules. 
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The concurrence identified additional interpretative rules relevant to 
the vesting inquiry.87 It emphasized that the majority opinion did not 
language tying healthcare benefits to pensions, while not conclusive, 
88 
 B. CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese  
Nearly three years after Tackett, on February 20, 2018, the 
Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision, CNH Industrial N.V. v. 
Reese,89 -Tackett decision 
in favor of a class of about four thousand retirees and spouses.90 
Based on the certiorari petition alone, the Court decided that retiree 
healthcare benefits did not survive the expiration of the CBA under 
which the retiree class members had retired.91 The Supreme Court 
Yard-Man 
issue, one that required no briefing and oral argument on the 
merits.92 
The Co
held that collective-bargaining agreements must be interpreted 
Tackett 
for that premise throughout the decision.93  In particular, Reese 
quoted Tackett
contract law that the written agreement is presumed to encompass 
94 
ples is  disclaimer that ordinary 
95 
Tackett cited Lincoln Mills96 for this proposition, but did not further 
 
87.   Id. (Ginsberg, J., concurring). 
88.   Id. at 443-444 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
89.   CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018). 
90.   Id. at 763, 766-67; Plaintiffs  Motion for Summary Judgment Ex F, Plaintiffs  Expert 
Report of Mark Lynne at 10, Reese v. CNH America LLC, 04- 70592 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 
2014), ECF No. 419-19.  
91.   Reese, 138 S. Ct. at 763, 766-67.  
92.   Id. at 766-67. 
93.   Id. at 763 (quoting M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 435 (2015)). 
94.  Id. 
95.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435.  
96.   Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).   
require "clear and express" evidence of vesting and noted that CBA 
was nevertheless relevant to ascertaining the parties' intent. 
summarily reversing the Sixth Circuit's post 
saw this, "[ s ]horn of inferences," as Ga "straightforward" 
urt began its analysis by stating: "This Court has long 
'according to ordinary principles of contract law,111 quoting 
's reference to Story and Williston for "the principle of 
the whole agreement of the parties." 
Obscured by the Supreme Court's laser focus on supposed 
"ordinary" contract princi Tackett's 
principles of contract interpretation apply to CB As "at least when 
those principles are not inconsistent with federal labor policy." 
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address this concept.97 Reese relegated Lincoln Mills to a parenthesis 
after its citation to Tackett and deleted any reference to federal labor 




Tackett had been airbrushed from judicial consideration, 
without so much as an ellipsis to mark its passing.  Worse, Tackett 
and Reese failed to acknowledge the very basic, and previously 
settled, concept of federal labor policy that collective bargaining 
agreements are not ordinary contracts.100 
Citing the 1874 version of Story on Contracts as applicable to 
CBAs101  although CBAs did not become enforceable in federal 
courts until 1947102  
unfamiliarity with, or disregard for, federal labor policy. Unlike 
written terms.  
A CBA is the amalgamation and evolution of hundreds of diverse 
terms and conditions of employment, a process that often takes 
decades  and many CBAs  to develop.103 Under federal labor policy, 
a CBA is intended to be one in a continuing series of such agreements 
between an employer and the labor organization chosen by the 
employees. Many of the governing rules and standards are 
determined by the day to day workplace practices developed over 
years and decades  rather than by the unadorned written words of 
the most recent agreement.104 
These issues have been extensively addressed by the Supreme 
Court in landmark decisions  decisions that both Tackett and Reese 
completely ignored. Those decisions will now be addressed. 
 
IV. BEFORE TACKETT  A CBA S NOT AN ORDINARY CONTRACT 
. . ., NOR IS IT GOVERNED BY THE SAME OLD COMMON-LAW 
 
97.   See Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435.   
98.   Reese, 138 S. Ct. at 763.  
99.  Id.  
100.   United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
101.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 440. 
102.   Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) 
(2012), provided that federal district courts had jurisdiction over disputes between 
employers and union arising under collective bargaining agreements.  
103.   Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578-80.  
104.   Id.  
asserted that the Court "has long 
held" that CBAs "must'' be construed '" according t 
principles of contract law."' 
, even the passing reference to "federal labor 
policy" in 
- demonstrates the present Supreme Court's 
"ordinary" contracts, a mature CBA is far more than its 
"I 
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CONCEPTS  
 A. Lincoln Mills and the Development of Federal Common 
Law Governing CBAs  
In the National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935,105 Congress 
established federal labor policy favoring collective bargaining as the 
means of ensuring industrial stability.106  Section 9 provided that 
labor organizations elected by employees would be the exclusive 
bargaining representatives in negotiations with their employer.107  
The Act, as amended and expanded by the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947,108 established a duty for the employer and 
certified union to bargain in good faith to reach a collective 
bargaining agreement.109 The expiration of a particular CBA does not 
terminate the relationship between the parties.110 To the contrary, 
federal law requires that the parties bargain in good faith about 
and, while bargaining, maintain existing terms and conditions of 
employment until they reach agreement or an impasse, even after the 
expiration of the existing CBA.111 The failure of either party to do so 
is an unfair labor practice.112 
In 1957, Lincoln Mills held that Section 301 of the Labor 
Management 
body of federal law for the enforcement of . . . collective bargaining 
113  Three years later, the Court decided several cases 
doing just that  fashioning federal law under Section 301 for the 
enforcement of contracts. 
In early 1960, the Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Benedict Coal 
Corp.114 There, a mine operator withheld contributions owed under 
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement to a jointly 
administered welfare benefit fund to offset damages caused by the 
 
105.   National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012)). 
106.   29 U.S.C. § 151.  
107.   29 U.S.C. § 159.  
108.   Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136. 
109.   29 U.S.C. §158(d) (2012). 
110.   Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991). 
111.   Id. at 198-99. 
112.   29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5), (b)(3). 
113.   Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).  
114.   Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960).  
,, 
"mandatory" subjects of bargaining to reach a successor agreement 
Relations Act "authorizes federal courts to fashion a 
agreements." 
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115 The Supreme Court 
and second, whether the operator had a valid counterclaim against 
the fund, a third-party beneficiary to the CBA.116 
After deciding against the operator on the first issue, the Court 
reviewed the status of contract law on the latter issue.117 Citing 
Corbin for the proposition that 
to allow the promisor to assert counter-claims against the beneficiary 
as well as the promise,118 the Supreme Court found such a result 
acceptable only if courts inferred an intention of the principle 
contracting parties that the third- 119 
considered whether it was appropriate to infer such a rule in the 
context of the contract before it.120  The Court declined to do so, 
here goes far beyond the mere performance to that third party . . 121 
provide security for employees and their families to enable them to 
meet problems arising from unemployment, illness, old age or 
122  Citing Lincoln Mills for its authority to fashion federal law 
under Section 301, the Court held, based on the several 
considerations it discussed, including federal labor policy, that 
parties to a CBA must agree in unequivocal language before the 
its 
 
115.   Id. at 460-62.  
116.   Id. at 466-67. 
117.   Id. at 467.  
118.   Id. at 466-67 (quoting 4 Corbin, Contracts § 819). The Court using the term 
counterclaim  and setoff  may be confusing in the context of a third-party beneficiary 
contract. As to a two-party contract for promises to pay money, the modern practice was 
for the promisor to offset[] the damages he has sustained against the amount he owes . . . 
 rather than be required to bring a separate action for damages. Id. at 467. 
119.   Id.   
120.   Id. at 468.  
121.   Id.  
122.   Id. The Court also noted that the CBA at issue was an industry wide-CBA and if 
employers generally reduce their contributions to the Fund based on damages claims 
against the union, the burden would fall on employees and their families. Id. at 469.  
union's violation of the CBA' s no strike clause. 
addressed two questions: first, whether the union's performance was 
a condition precedent of the operator's promise to pay into the fund; 
it "may perhaps, be regarded as just'' 
party's rights were so limited. 
While, according to the Court, this suggestion of an inference "has 
not been crystallized into a rule of construction," the Court 
stating: "This collective bargaining agreement, however, is not a 
typical third party contract. The promisor' s interest in the third party 
II 
The Court identified that the employer's interest is rooted in the 
"commonplace of modem industrial relations for employers to 
death." 
union's breach of promises under a CBA give rise to an employer's 
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defense against a duty owed to the third-party welfare fund.123 
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter agreed that CBAs were not 
ordinary contracts, but thought it inappropriate to disregard all the 
124 He stated that those 
relation to which contracts are made and duly allow for these variant 
125 He continued: 
greements for the reciprocal rights 
and obligations of employers and employees, account must be taken 
of the many implications relevant to construing a document that 
126 
Justice Frankfurter found this to be no reason for jettisoning 
attitude in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as 
they are to contracts dealing with other affairs, even giving due 
regard to the circumstances of industrial life and to the libretto that 
127  He 
reclude the application of the 
 . . 
bottomed upon notions of fa 128 
A few months later, the Supreme Court, in three seminal cases 
known as the Steelworker Trilogy,129 addressed the special nature of 
collectively bargained contracts in the context of arbitration.  In 
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,130 the 
Court explained the fundamental difference between a labor contract 
and a commercial contract: 
The collective bargaining agreement . . . is more than a 
contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases 
 
123.   Id. at 470-71. 
124.   Id. at 475 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
125.   Id. 
126.   Id.  
127.   Id. at 475-76. 
128.   Id. at 476 (quoting Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 
57 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1958)). 
129.   United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960); United Steelworkers 
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. 
Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 594-96 (1960). 
130.   Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
"governing rules pertaining to contracts." 
ordinary rules already "recognize the diversity of situations in 
factors in construing and enforcing contracts." 
"And so, of course, in construing a 
governs industrial relations." 
ordinary contract principles when they "are as relevant to the law's 
this furnishes in construing collective bargaining agreements." 
ended by quoting Archibald Cox, "one of our most experienced 
students of labor law," for the proposition that, just because CBAs 
have many characteristics that "p 
familiar principles of contracts and agency," it would nevertheless 
be unwise to "discard all precepts of contract law," because many of 
those principles represent "an accumulation of wisdom, 
irness and sound public policy." 
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which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. . . . The 
collective agreement covers the whole employment 
relationship. It calls into being a new common law the 
common law of a particular industry or of a particular 
plant.131 
The Court expounded on that principle, by again quoting 
Archibald Cox, albeit from a later article: 
 . . [I]t is not unqualifiedly true that a collective-bargaining 
upon which the claim is founded. There are too many 
people, too many problems, too many unforeseeable 
contingencies to make the words of the contract the 
exclusive source of rights and duties. One cannot reduce all 
the rules governing a community like an industrial plant to 
fifteen or even fifty pages. Within the sphere of collective 
bargaining, the institutional characteristics and the 
governmental nature of the collective-bargaining process demand 
a common law of the shop which implements and furnishes the 
context of the agreement. We must assume that intelligent 
negotiators acknowledged so plain a need unless they 
s 132 
The Court noted that in other kinds of contracts, parties enter 
contracts voluntarily, in the sense that there is no compulsion to deal 
with one another, as opposed to dealing with other persons.133  The 
collective bargaining relationship is different because it exists by 
force of federal statute; the employer cannot choose with whom to 
all aspects of the complicated relationship, from the most crucial to 
134 Because of the 
provisions, some fairly objective and 
135 industrial common law  the 
practices of the industry and the shop  is equally a part of the collective 
bargaining agreement although not expressed in it 136 
 
131.   Id. at 578-79.  
132.   Id. at 579-80 (emphasis added) (quoting Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor 
Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1498-99 (1959)).  
133.   Id. at 580.  
134.   Id.  
135.   Id.   
136.   Id. at 581-82 (emphasis added).  
tated a contrary rule in plain words.' 
contract. And, a "mature labor agreement may attempt to regulate 
the most minute over an extended period of time." 
''breadth of the matters covered, as well as the need for a fairly 
concise and readable instrument," a CBA will contain a variety of 
detailed and others "more or 
less specific" that "require reason and judgment in their 
application." According to the Court, " 
II 
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In United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing 
Co.,137 another of the Steelworker Trilogy, the Court held that a state 
on the supposed plain me
138  Justice Brennan wrote in his 
concurring opinion to all three Trilogy decisions: 
collective bargaining agreement, rightly viewed by the Court to be 
the charter instrument of a system of industrial self-government, like 
words in a statute, are to be understood only by reference to the 
139 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation addressed the role of arbitrators in the 
collective bargaining system,140 but the nature and meaning of a 
CBA, and the intent of the parties to a CBA, do not change depending 
on the forum in which that agreement is construed and enforced.141 
The lesson of Warrior & Gulf Navigation is certainly that when courts 
undertake to interpret CBAs, they must immerse themselves in the 
law of the shop to correctly perform their interpretive function of 
and com
what the labor agreement means.142 
The Supreme Court decided a series of cases based on these 
principles. In 1964, the Court decided John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Livingston,143 where it held that a successor employer was bound to 
arbitrate a dispute with a union under a CBA to which it was not a 
party.144 Citing Warrior & Gulf Navigation
principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a 
contract an unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a 
 
137.   United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).  
138.   Id. at 566-67. 
139.   Id. at 570 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
140.   Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574.   
141.   In Senior v. NSTAR Electric & Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206, 220 (1st Cir. 2006), the First 
Circuit stated that the rule enunciated by Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. is not simply a 
rule about the power of arbitrators. The rule has been recognized and used by courts, 
including the Supreme Court, as substantive law of labor contract interpretation.  As the 
Court stressed in NLRB v. Strong, [a]rbitrators and courts are still the principal sources of 
contract interpretation.  393 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1969); Accord Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. 
NLRB., 501 U.S. 190 (1991).  
142.   Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581-582. 
143.   John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
144.   Id. at 548.  
court's "preoccupation with ordinary contract law," that is, reliance 
aning of a CBA, "could have a crippling 
effect on grievance arbitration." 
"Words in a 
background which gave rise to their inclusion." 
determining the parties' intent. Courts must undertake this 
heightened responsibility because they lack the "same experience 
petence" that labor arbitrators bring to the determination of 
, the Court stated "While the 
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145 
In 1966, in Transportation-Communication Employees v. Union 
Pacific R. Co.,146 the Court employed these principles to decisions of 
the National Railroad Adjustment Board, stating: 
A collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary 
contract for the purchase of goods and services, nor is it 
governed by the same old common-law concepts which 
 . . [I]t is a generalized code 
to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsman cannot 
wholly anticipate. . . . The collective agreement covers the 
whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new 
common law  the common law of a particular industry 
or of a  . .In order to interpret such an 
agreement it is necessary to consider the scope of other 
related collective bargaining agreements, as well as the 
practice, usage and custom pertaining to all such 
agreements.147 
In DelCostello v. Teamsters,148 the Supreme Court held that the 
federal statute of limitations for unfair labor practices, rather than 
state limitations periods, was applicable to Section 301 breach of 
contract and duty of fair representation claims.149 The Court 
explained that when the federal policies at stake are not in line with 
150 
The Court continued: 
of a federal law of collective bargaining, it is of the utmost 
importance that the law reflect the realities of industrial life 
and the nature of the collective bargaining process. We 
should not assume that doctrines evolved in other contexts 
will be equally well adapted to the collective bargaining 
process. 151 
In Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service,152 the Court addressed the issue 
of apportioning damages in a hybrid breach of contract and duty of 
 
145.   Id. at 550.  
146.   Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157 (1966). 
147.  Id. at 160-61 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
148.   DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).   
149.   Id. at 166.  
150.   Id. at 172. 
151. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 358 (1964) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring)). 
152.   Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983).  
collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract." 
control such private contracts.'.
particular plant.'.
state law, "[w]e have not hesitated to tum away from state law." 
As Justice Goldberg cautioned, '[I]n this Court's fashioning 
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fair representation action brought by a discharged employee against 
his employer.153 In defining the interests implicated, the Court cited 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases 
154 The Court then 
agreement [a CBA], the Court has applied an evolving federal 
155 
In NRLB v. Bildisco,156 the Court, citing John Wiley & Sons and 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation, agreed with the courts of appeals that the 
ive-bargaining contract, and the 
treatment in bankruptcy compared to executory contracts.157 In 
,158 a 1989 
decision involving a disput
implementation of drug testing,159 the Court quoted much of the 
above from Transportation Employees  including the passage that 
-law concepts which 
 
160 The Court agreed 
terms of the CBA, as 
[the] controversy [was] properly deemed a minor dispute within the 
161 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation162 is the seminal case for 
understanding the unique nature of collective bargaining 
agreements, how they differ from commercial contracts, and how 
they must therefore be properly construed in the context of the 
 
153.   Id. at 214.   
154.   Id. at 224 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
578 (1960)). 
155.   Id. at 224-25 (citing United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); 
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)). 
156.   NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).  
157.   Id. at 524  
158.   Consol. Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executive Ass n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989).  
159.   Id. at 300-01.   
160.   Id. at 311. 
161.   Id. at 312. 
162.   United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).   
for the proposition that a CBA "is more 
which the draftsman cannot wholly anticipate." 
continued: "In defining the relationships created by such an 
common law grounded in national labor policy." 
"special nature of a collect 
consequent 'law of the shop' which it creates," required different 
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executive Ass'n 
e over the employer's unilateral 
CBAs are not "governed by same old common 
control such private contracts" - for the proposition that "it is well 
established that the parties' 'practice, usage and custom' is of 
significance in interpreting their agreement." 
that the employer's contractual claim, resting "solely upon implied 
interpreted in light of past practice," was 
"neither frivolous nor obviously insubstantial and for that reason, 
exclusive jurisdiction of the [Railway Labor] Board." 
"common law" of the "particular industry" and the "particular 
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163 By ignoring Warrior & Gulf Navigation, and the line of cases 
affirming its concept of federal labor policy, the Supreme Court in 
Tackett and Reese ignored as well the established principle that CBAs 
cts. Tackett and Reese imposed ordinary 
rules of contract interpretation on CBAs even though the Supreme 
Court had previously held, in Transportation Employees
same old common-law concepts which control . . 
do not apply to CBAs.164 
majority opinion in Tackett,165 had joined the majority opinion in 
Consolidated Rail in 1989.166  Both had separately stressed the 
importance of the doctrine of stare decisis.167  Still, at oral argument in 
Tackett, Justice Scalia revealed a breathtaking lack of understanding 
of the federal labor policy issues involved and a total disregard for 
the precedent he endorsed in Consolidated Rail: 
You know, the nice thing about a contract case of this sort 
el bad about it. Whoever loses deserves to 
lose. (Laughter) I mean, this thing is obviously an 
important feature.  Both sides knew it [the issue of vesting] 
was left unaddressed, so, you know, whoever loses 
deserves to lose for casting this upon us when it could have 
been said very clearly in the contract.  Such an important 
feel bad about it.168 
 
163.   Id. at 579.   
164.   Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1966). Of 
course, whether the Court applied ordinary rules  of contract interpretation to the CBAs 
in Tackett (and Reese) is itself debatable. See generally Robert A Hillman, The Supreme Court s 
Application of Ordinary Contract Principles  to the Issue of the Duration of Retiree Healthcare 
Benefits Perpetuating the Interpretation/Gap-Filling Quagmire, 32 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299, 
310 (2017); Tex Pasley, Ordinary Principles of Contract Interpretation v. Ordinary Principles of 
Contract Interpretation: The Future of Retiree Healthcare Benefits After M&G Polymers v. Tackett, 
24 VA. J. SOC. POL Y & L. 125 (2017). But, that question goes beyond the scope of this article. 
165.   See M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 429 (2015). 
166.   Consol. Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 299.  
167.   See notes 39-42, supra.   
168.   Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 
427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).   
plant." 
are not "ordinary" contra 
, that "the 
. private contracts" 
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, who joined Justice Thomas' 
is you can't fe 
feature. So I hope we'll get it right, but, you know, I can't 
No one was asking any Justice to "feel bad" about who wins and 
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who loses.169 Tackett presented a legal not an equitable issue.170 The 
basic function of the Supreme Court is to get the legal issues right 
issues. In any contract case, the basic role of the courts is to determine 
and enforce the intent of the parties at the time they contracted, not 
to erect artificial barriers to a full understanding what the parties 
meant.171 
When the contract involved is a collective bargaining 
agreement, and federal labor policy is involved, the same-old rules 
of who wins and who loses in a commercial contract dispute do not 
govern.172 The terms of a CBA are not 
not the 
entire agreement. The intent of the parties as to the 
obligation for retiree healthcare benefits may be unclear, that is, 
that obligation was in existence.  When a CBA is before a court, the 
r more than an examination 
of the written document.173  When the Court issued Warrior & Gulf 
 
169.   Justice Breyer responded to Justice Scalia: Well, you know, the workers who 
discover they ve been retired for five years and don t have any health benefits might feel 
a little bad about it.  Id. at 22. But Justice Breyer himself apparently never learned that 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation refuted Justice Scalia s erroneous and limited view of the nature 
of the contract  before the Court  that is, that parties had to say things very clearly  in 
a CBA for an obligation to arise. 
170.   Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (Scalia, J.) 
(claim for money due under contract is an action at law).  
171.   Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. Cal., 813 
F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., 281 
F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir.2002) ( [T]he fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give 
effect to the mutual intent of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting. ); Liberty 
Nat l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat l Trust & Sav. Ass n, 218 F.2d 831, 840 (10th 
Cir. 1955) ( [T]he basic rule of universal acceptation for the ascertainment of [the parties] 
intention is for the court, so far as possible, to put itself in the place of the parties when 
their minds met upon the terms of the agreement. . .. ) (alteration in original); 11 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON AND RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §30:6 at 108 (4th ed. 
2012)( [T]he underlying goal in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intent of the 
parties, and the surrounding circumstances when the parties entered the contract, among 
other relevant considerations, may well shed light on that intent ). 
172.   Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 160 (1966). 
173.   This article is not about the substance of the CBAs involved or about whether the 
Court accurately applied ordinary  rules of contract interpretation to those CBAs. That 
topic is for another time. But, in Reese, when the language relating to retiree healthcare 
benefits was first agreed upon in 1971, the employer s chief benefit negotiator wrote a 
letter to every retiree informing them that, if the retiree died first, the retiree s surviving 
spouse would have healthcare for the remainder of her lifetime.  This promise was 
repeatedly reiterated by the employer over the next quarter of a century. See Brief for Fox 
Retiree Committee et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, M&G Polymers USA, 
and to correctly apply the Court's precedential decisions to those 
limited to what is "said very 
clearly" in the written document because the written CBA is 
employer's 
ambiguous in the written CBA, but "very clear" from the decades 
inquiry into the parties' intent involves fa 
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Navigation in 1960, it understood this  as it understood the 
complexity of understanding and interpreting the meaning of the 
provisions of a CBA, informed as they are by the common law of the 
industry and the shop. 
This is where Tackett and Reese so utterly failed.  If, as Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation  the practices of the 
industry and the shop  is equally a part of the collective bargaining 
Tackett and 
Reese 
174 In Tackett and 
Reese, the Court adopted a presumption directly contrary to Supreme 
Court precedent, a presumption that precludes any judicial 
determination of what a collective bargaining agreement actually 
consists of  and thus what its individual provisions actually mean. 
In furtherance of its new presumption, Tackett criticized the 
175 There, the Court 
quoted Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB.176  Tackett also quoted 
Litton 
[may] provid[e] in explicit terms that certain benefits continue after 
177 But, Tackett 
is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer 
178 
Tackett omitted two critical sentences from Litton.179 Those 
Rights which accrued or vested under the agreement will, as a 
180 And, the 
 
LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  
174.   Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581-82; Tackett, 574 U.S. at 440; CNH Indus. 
N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 763 (2018) 
175.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441-442 (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 
207 (1991)). 
176.   Litton, 501 U.S. 190. In Litton, the issue was whether courts owed deference to the 
National Labor Relations Board s interpretation of a CBA. The Court held that it did not, 
because [a]rbitrators and the courts, rather than the Board, are the principal sources of 
contract interpretation under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.  Id. at 
202. 
177.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441-442 (alteration in original) (quoting Litton, 501 U.S. at 207). 
178.   Id. at 442. 
179.   See Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441-442; But see Litton, 501 U.S. at 207.   
180.   Litton, 501 U.S. at 207. In fact, despite Tackett s criticism, the Sixth Circuit had already 
fully addressed the principles set forth in Litton. In Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 
648 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth Circuit rejected Kelsey-Hayes  argument, based on Litton, that 
held, "industrial common law -
agreement although not expressed in it," how can it be, as 
declared, that "the written agreement is presumed to 
encompass the whole agreement of the parties?" 
Sixth Circuit for not heeding "the traditional principle that 
'contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary course, upon 
termination of the bargaining agreement.111 
for the proposition that "'a collective bargaining agreement 
the agreement's expiration.111 stated: "when a contract 
that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life." 
sentences are: "Exceptions are determined by contract interpretation. 
general rule, survive termination of the agreement." 
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Tackett concurrence quoted from an earlier passage in Litton for the 
 upon the employer after the 
expiration date of a collective-  . . may be 
well from the . . 181 
To highlight the obvious, Tackett
Litton
consistent with the same point in Transportation Employees, 
Consolidated Rail and Warrior & Gulf Navigation.182 Terms of a CBA 
may be implicit in the written agreement, and properly derived from 
agreement 183 
Examples such as this illuminate that something other than 
ignorance of precedent was at work.  Another illustration is Tackett
quotation from Stolt- ,184 coming 
immediately after its citation to Lincoln Mills, as support for the 
185  Stolt-Nielsen 
was not the interpretation of CBAs, but the issue of whether 
language in a commercial arbitration clause, interpreted under the 
Federal Arbitration Act,186 
commercial disputes.187 
When there are several existing Supreme Court cases that 
directly address labor arbitration under Section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act, including the 
entire Steelworker Trilogy, as well as John Wiley & Sons and 
Transportation Employees, the use of Stolt-Nielsen as the first citation 
after Lincoln Mills is an odd choice, even for an unremarkable 
 
retirees must prove an express agreement  to vest. Id. at 655. The Sixth Circuit noted that 
Kelsey-Hayes ignored the same two sentences of Litton that are missing from Tackett s 
discussion. Id 
181.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Litton, 501 U.S. at 207).  
182.   See Litton, 501 U.S. at 202, 203, 209 (citing both Lincoln Mills and Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation in its discussion of the federal  law applicable to the interpretation of CBAs). 
183.   United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) 
(emphasis added). Also see Tackett, 135 U.S. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Litton, 501 U.S. at 207). 
184.   Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).  
185.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435. 
186.   Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (2019).  
187.   Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 666, 667. 
proposition that "'[C]onstraints
bargaining agreement' 
derived from the agreement's 'explicit terms,' but they 'may arise as 
. implied terms of the expired agreement."' 
's inclusion of "explicit'' and 
omission of "implied" distorts 's point, which was entirely 
customs, usages and practices because this "common law" of the 
industry and the shop "is equally a part of the collective bargaining 
although not expressed in it." 
's 
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. 
proposition that in interpreting CBAs "the parties' intentions 
control." What is interesting is that the "endeavor" in 
permitted "class" arbitration of 
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principle that the goal of contract interpretation is to discern the 
holding in Stolt-Neilsen has 
nothing to do with interpreting CBAs  the issue before Tackett.  
There is no doubt, for instance, that union grievances under CBAs 
often address issues affecting a group or class of employees. The 
in the bargaining unit.  
Further, Supreme Court decisions on arbitration under a CBA, 
as noted, take a far more expansive vi
CBA is not limited to the written words of the document and the 
of the industry and shop as well. What is interesting, if perhaps 
insignificant in analyzing how Tackett came to be decided, is that, in 
Stolt-Nielsen
decision in Tackett, cited both Warrior & Gulf Navigation and John 
Wiley & Sons for general principles relating to arbitration.188 Five 
years later, when Warrior & Gulf Navigation and John Wiley & Sons 
held the actual precedent for the precise issue before Tackett, the 
same judges ignored those decisions.189 In other words, Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation and John Wiley & Sons had not been erased from 
Supreme Court history; just any precedential value they held as to 
what constitutes a collectively bargained agreement under federal 
labor policy. 
Reese that collective-
190 In this statement, supported only by 
Tackett and a parenthetical citation to Lincoln Mills, Reese completely 
re- eliance on Lincoln Mills as requiring 
it to hold that the opposite is true  
contract law do not apply to CBAs. In fact, Reese goes much farther 
than Justice Frankfurter thought wise in his considered but solitary 
dissent in Benedict Coal. Even Justice Frankfurter, in fearing that all 
ordinary contract principles would be abandoned in Section 301 
inquiries, nevertheless understood that federal labor policy was 
critical in understanding what CBAs are and how they are 
 
188.   Id. at 683 (citing Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581); Id. at 685 (citing 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (quoting John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)).   
189.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 429; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 544; Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. at 575.  
190.   CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 763 (2018) (quoting Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435).  
parties' intent. It is more so because the 
union is, after all, the "collective" bargaining agent of all employees 
ew of what the "contract'' 
between the parties is and how the parties' intent is disclosed; the 
parties' intent can only by discerned by examining the common law 
, the same justices who joined in Justice Thomas' 
's appraisal is that the Court "has long held 
bargaining agreements must be interpreted 'according to ordinary 
principles of contract law.111 
writes the Court's historical r 
- that the "same old" rules of 
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interpreted.191 
Reese, without explanation in a per curiam decision, abandoned 
any and all pretense that federal labor policy is even relevant to the 
interpretation of CBAs. According to Reese, CBAs, even those first 
cording to 
 period.192 This seems to be the 
ultimate abnegation of the principles underlying stare decisis  that 
the Court, by not identifying past precedent, can unanimously 
implement a legal standard that even a lone dissenter long ago had 
rejected as inappropriate to the interpretation of CBAs. 
It may be pertinent to point out here that, in citing Lincoln Mills, 
Tackett got the nuance wrong. The focus of Lincoln Mills was not on 
employing state law to interpret CBAs  it was on encouraging 
effectuate federal labor policy, resorting to state law only if a court 
193  This 
is what Lincoln Mills held: 
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits 
under §301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion 
from the policy of our national labor laws . . .. The Labor 
Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some 
substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may 
not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the 
penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack 
express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at 
the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that 
will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness 
will be determined by the nature of the problem. . . . Federal 
interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. . . . 
But state law, if compatible with the purpose of §301, may be 
resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the 
federal policy. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be 
absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of 
private rights.194 
 
191.   Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 475-76 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See 
also David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 
663, 664 n.4 (1973). In discussing the evolution of Supreme Court decisions before and after 
Lincoln Mills, Professor David Feller states that, after the Steelworker Trilogy, the effort to 
construct a legal theory following conventional contract lines was largely abandoned.  Id. 
Until, that is, Tackett and Reese.  
192.   Reese, 138 S. Ct. at 763 (quoting Tackett, 574 U.S. at 435).   
193.   Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).  
194.   Id. at 456-57 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  
negotiated decades ago, now "must be interpreted 'ac 
ordinary principles of contract law"' -
"judicial inventiveness" in fashioning substantive federal law to 
determines that state law "will best effectuate federal policy." 
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So, Tackett got it wrong. But Reese, in stating that Tackett 
required
must 195 got it wrong and 
backward. Before Tackett, the Supreme Court never held that federal 
courts were required to apply ordinary principles of contract law. 
And, Lincoln Mills 
compatible with the purpose of Section 301.196 There is a critical, 
unsubtle di
Reese, and words in Lincoln Mills that are conditional 
197 
Even if read in isolation  without regard to subsequent 
Supreme Court precedent holding that CBAs are not ordinary 
contracts  Lincoln Mills cannot be read to mandate the application of 
ordinary contract law in the interpretation of CBAs. By recognizing 
198 will be needed to address 
the myriad issues underlying federal labor policy, Lincoln Mills 
necessarily rejects the notion that federal common law under Section 
301 is confined to ordinary state law contract principles. 
If this were not enough, both Tackett and Reese asserted, or at 
retiree healthcare.199 But, as the Tackett concurrence noted, the CBA 
eligible for retiree healthcare.200 When a retiree died, the surviving 
 . . until death 
or rem 201 These are durational provisions. While these 
provisions may not be conclusive evidence of an intent to vest, they 
-justice 
concurrence stated, those provisions are, at the very l
202 
 
195.   Reese, 138 S. Ct. at 762-63 (emphasis added). 
196.   Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.  
197.   See, e.g., Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 789 (2018) (unlike prior statute, new statute 
does not say may,  it does not say reasonable,  and it certainly does not say anything 
about discretion. ).  
198.   Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.  
199.   M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441; Reese, 138 S.S Ct. at 766. 
200.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 444 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
201.   Id. (internal quotations omitted); see Brief of Respondents at 16-17, M&G Polymers 
USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (No. 13-1010). 
202.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 441, 444 (discussing the concept of silence  in the context of the 
traditional rule  that ambiguous writings should not be construed to create lifetime 
promises,  (citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §553, at 216 (1960)). Putting aside whether a 
" " federal courts to interpret CBAs according to "ordinary 
principles of contract law," and that the Supreme Court has "long 
held" that CBAs " " be so interpreted, 
held only that state law "may" be resorted to "if' 
fference between words of mandate ("required" or 
"must"), used in 
and discretionary ("if" and "may"). 
that a "range of judicial inventiveness" 
least suggested, that the CBAs were "silent" as to the duration of 
explicitly provided that retirees "receiving a monthly pension" were 
spouse "will continue to receive [healthcare] benefits .
arriage." 
belie the notion of "silence" as to duration. Indeed, as the four 
east, "relevant 
to this examination" on remand and in other cases. 
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The retirees and surviving spouses whose healthcare benefits 
were at risk in Tackett are entitled to and receiving a vested, lifetime 
pension  and will be until they die. Tackett simply re-wrote the CBA, 
ignoring relevant evidence of intent, and provided M&G Polymers 
and other employers with a huge advantage in shedding its retiree 
healthcare obligations, under the false premise the CBAs were silent 
as to duration. 
The damage done to retirees (and to federal labor law) was 
immediate.203 In Gallo v. Moen Inc.,204 a post-Tackett decision, the Sixth 
Circuit declined to review extrinsic evidenc
from the four corners of their contract and from traditional canons of 
contract interpretation. . . . Absent ambiguity from this threshold 
inquiry, no basis 
205 
Gallo -assured pronouncement is contrary to Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation  
written CBA  
206 
to the written text. But, this textual primacy concept in Tackett and 
 
promise of healthcare until death or remarriage  constitutes silence or contains an 
ambiguity, retiree healthcare is hardly operative in perpetuity,  the phrase Tackett quoted 
from Corbin. By retirement, most of the retiree s lifetime  has passed in childhood and 
decades of adult work needed to qualify for the benefit. Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 
993 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating, the obligation for which the plaintiffs contend 
in this suit is not perpetual, because retired people and their widows (or widowers) do not 
live forever.  Perhaps a reasonable time  for the operation of the promise in the CBA is 
that found in the CBA  until death or remarriage  of the retiree s spouse.  
203.   After Tackett, only Tackett retirees survived in the Sixth Circuit. Reese summarily 
reversed a post-Tackett decision in favor of retirees. Reese v. CNH America, LLC, 854 F.3d 
877 (6th Cir. 2017). In Cole v. Meritor, Inc., 855 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2017), the Sixth Circuit 
reversed itself on reconsideration, holding that a CBA that had previously 
unambiguously  provided for vested benefits, 549 F.3d 1064, 1075 (6th Cir 2008) after 
Tackett, did not  as a matter of law. In Watkins v. Honeywell International, Inc., 875 F.3d 
312 (6th Cir. 2017), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court s dismissal based on Tackett. 
After Reese, no panel has yet had the temerity to suggest that any employer ever intended 
to vest benefits, regardless of previously probative evidence suggesting otherwise. See 
Cooper v. Honeywell International, Inc., 884 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2018); Fletcher v. Honeywell 
International, Inc., 892 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2018). 
204.   Gallo v. Moen Inc., 813 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2016). 
205.   Id. at 273-74.  
206.   Id. at 273; See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 582 (1960).  
e of the employer's intent 
because "[t]he first and best way to divine the intent of the parties is 
for going beyond the contract's four comers 
exists." 
's self 
's holding that evidence of the common law of the shop -
evidence that is by definition outside the "four comers" of the 
-is "equally a part of the [CBA] although not expressed 
in it." If the "four comers" of a CBA are not confined to the 
"written" CBA, it is error to confine analysis of the meaning of a CBA 
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Reese  
interpretation rather than federal labor policy  is now apparently 
the law of the land, despite long standing, well-developed Supreme 
Court precedent directly to the contrary. 
 B. Pittsburgh Plate Glass  Vested Retirement Rights Cannot 
 
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Allied Chemical & Alkali 
Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.207 The issue was whether the 
unilateral mid-term modification of the retiree healthcare 
plan for employees already retired constituted an unfair labor 
practice.208 The Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit, holding, inter alia, 
that retirees were not employees within the statutory bargaining unit 
and therefore, the union had no statutory duty to represent them in 
bargaining.209 The Court also held that bargaining over the 
healthcare benefits of employees already retired is a permissive, 
rather than a mandatory subject of bargaining.210 The Court 
-term modification of 
retiree healthcare benefits was not an unfair labor practice.211 
The Supreme Court stated in a footnote that its holding did not 
leave the retirees without protection.212 To the contrary, the Court 
observed, if their former employer changed their benefits without 
their consent, the retirees would have a breach of contract claim 
under Section 301: 
Since retirees are not members of the bargaining unit, the 
bargaining agent is under no statutory duty to represent 
them in negotiations with the employer. . . . This does not 
mean that when a union bargains for retirees which 
nothing in this opinion precludes if the employer agrees
the retirees are without protection. Under established 
contract principles, vested retirement rights may not be 
moreover, would have a federal remedy under § 301 of the 
 
207.   Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.157 (1971). 
208.   Id. at 159-60. 
209.   Id. at 160, 166, 188. 
210.   Id. at 185. Under the National Labor Relations Act, the employer and union have a 
duty to bargain in good faith only as to mandatory  subjects of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 
158(d) (2012). Refusal to bargain about mandatory subject of bargaining is an unfair labor 
practice; refusal to bargain about permissive subjects of bargaining is not. See, id.  
211.   Id. at 188. 
212.   Id. at 181 n.20.  
- ostensibly derived from "ordinary" principles of contract 
be Altered Without the Pensioner's Consent
employer's 
concluded, therefore, that the employer's mid 
altered without the pensioner's consent. The retiree, 
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Labor Management Relations Act for breach of contract if 
his benefits were unilaterally changed.213 
Inherent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass is the concept that retiree 
healthcare benefits could vest during the term of a CBA, even though 
the CBA would, as a matter of course, expire. Also inherent is the 
concept that if, before or after the CBA expired, the employer 
changed those benefits, the retiree had an individual breach of 
contract action under Section 301 to enforce vested rights in federal 
court. Pittsburgh Plate Glass addressed retiree healthcare benefits in 
the context of federal labor law and policy.214 
In fact, Yard-Man
on factors addressed in 1971 in Pittsburgh Plate Glass  that retiree 
benefits are a permissive subject of bargaining.215  In the same 
context, Yard-Man
typically understood as a form of delayed compensation echoes the 
statement in Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
retirement benefits of active workers are a part and parcel of their 
overall compensation . . 216 And Yard-Man
employees would want assurances that their retirement benefits 
would continue regardless of future agreements,217 echoes the 
analysis in Pittsburgh Plate Glass of the dangers to retirees inherent in 
the situation in which unions represented the conflicting interests of 
current employees and retirees in future negotiations.218 
Yard-Man found it is reasonable that employees would make 
certain that they nailed down their retirement benefits before they 
retire.219 Otherwise, the vagaries of future negotiations, and the 
shifting balance of power between employer and union, would 
deprive them of the contractual protection afforded in Pittsburgh 
 
213.   Id. (internal citations omitted).  
214.   Id. at 185.   
215.  UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983). This contextual  
analysis was also based, at least in part, on Brennan s concurrence in American 
Manufacturing. See, id. at 1479. 
216.   Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 180.   
217.   Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.  
218.  Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 180-82. There is an inherent conflict between the 
interest and power of current employees, whom employers need for production and who 
vote on CBAs, and retirees, whose value to the employer is past and who most often cannot 
not vote on CBAs after retirement. The retirees' power is derived entirely from vested 
contract rights earned prior to retirement. 
219.   Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482. 
's 1983 "contextual" inference, that is, one 
based on "the context in which these benefits arose," was premised 
's description of retiree healthcare benefits as being 
that: "To be sure, the future 
II 's analysis that 




collective bargaining, including the mandatory/permissive 
dichotomy of bargaining. In doing so, Tackett did not mention 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the case Yard-Man cited for that discussion.221  
Tackett denigrated Yard Man
provisions222 without addressing the fact that its analysis was 
necessarily derived from the Pittsburgh Plate Glass principle that 
retiree benefits cannot be taken away in subsequent negotiations 
 something that would happen only if 
the then current CBA had expired. Tackett criticized Yard-
discussion of retiree healthcare benefits as a form of delayed 
compensation without ever mentioning that Yard-Man relied 
expressly on Pittsburgh Plate Glass for that analysis.223 
In dismissing the idea that retiree healthcare constituted 
Tackett cited the definition in ERISA as 
whereas retiree healthcare benefit plans were welfare benefit 
plans.224 Of course, Congressional policy as to which benefits 
parties to a CBA. Indeed, the CBA language promising retiree 
healthcare at issue in Reese was negotiated in 1971,225 years before 
ERISA became effective.226 
 
220.   Id.   
221.   In Tackett, the Court discounted the fact that retiree healthcare was a permissive 
subject of bargaining, stating that [p]arties, however, can and do voluntarily agree to 
make retiree benefits a subject of mandatory collective  bargaining. Indeed, the employer 
and union in this case entered into such an agreement.  M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. 
Tackett, 574 U.S. at 439. That statement mirrors the argument of the National Labor 
Relations Board in Pittsburgh Plate Glass that the bargaining over retiree benefits had 
become an industrial practice. The Court s response then was that would at most . . . 
reflect the interests of employers and employees in the subject matter as well as its 
amenability to the collective-bargaining process; it would not be determinative. Common 
practice cannot change the law and make into bargaining unit employees  those who are 
not.  Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 176. In any event, the issue of whether parties to 
a CBA agreed to view retiree benefits as a mandatory subject simply changes the context  
of the particular negotiations. And, if the agreement to do so came after the obligation had 
come due, that agreement would not impact employees already retired and whose rights 
had vested. See, id. at 180-181 n.20. 
222.   Tackett, 574 U.S. at 440. 
223.   Id.   
224.   Id. (citing ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (2012)).  
225.   Reese v. CNH America, LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 318 (6th Cir. 2009). 
226.   See generally, 29 U.S.C §1061 (Sept. 2, 1974) Employee Retirement Income Security 
Man's reliance on the "context" of 
's analysis of general termination 
without the retiree's consent-
Man's 
"delayed compensation," 
including plans resulting in "deferral of income" as pension plans, 
Congress intends to statutorily regulate and protect as "pension 
benefits" says nothing about the understanding or intent of the 
In any event, a "deferral of income" as 
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defined by ERISA, means wages where the payment is deferred until 
a later time to defer tax consequences.227 Congress needed a 
definition for the benefit it was addressing but did not forever 
prohibit the use of that term in common parlance to include other 
postretirement benefits. 
Before Tackett, the Supreme Court had never relied on ERISA to 
nder a 
CBA. To the contrary, in Litton, decided 15 years after ERISA became 
law, the Court understood that severance pay was considered a form 
228 Litton 
had this understanding despite the fact that, under ERISA, 
229 
In 1990, nearly fifteen years after ERISA became effective, the 
Financial Accounting Board established FASB 106, the rule that 
requires private sector employers to disclose the present value of the 
cost of retiree healthcare benefits.230 The Board explained: 
view that a defined postretirement benefit plan sets forth 
the terms of an exchange between the employer and the 
employee. In exchange for the current services provided by 
the employee, the employer promises to provide, in 
addition to current wages and other benefits, health and 
other welfare benefits after the employee retires. It follows 
from that view that postretirement benefits are not 
services rendered. Since payment is deferred, the benefits are a 
type of deferred com
compensation is incurred as employees render the services 
necessary to earn postretirement benefits.231 
As employees, retirees viewed their retirement benefits, both 
pensions and healthcare, as benefits they had earned through 
 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829.  
227.   See ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2012).  
228.    Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1991) (citing Nolde Brothers, 
Inc. v. Bakery & Confect. Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977)). In Litton, the Court 
disagreed that a seniority provision that included an aptitude requirement that could 
change over time, was a form of deferred compensation. Id. at 210. 
229.   ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1002(2)(B) (2012). 
230.   See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, Summary of Statement No. 106 (Dec. 
1990), http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum106.shtml.  
231.   Id. (emphasis added). 
determine what benefits might have "vested" or "accrued" u 
of "deferred compensation" that could vest under a CBA. 
"severance pay" and "supplemental retirement income payments," 
like retiree healthcare benefits, can be considered "welfare plans 
rather than pension plans." 
The Board's conclusions in this Statement result from the 
gratuities but are part of an employee's compensation for 
pensation. The employer's obligation for that 
2019] WHERE THE LAW ENDS 173 
 
decades of labor. Upon retirement, retirees understand the benefits 
they have earned cannot be taken away. In many cases, employees 
decide to retire early, or to take an early retirement package offered 
by an employer, as many did in Reese, because they were uncertain 
what might happen in future negotiations. They decided to retire 
early to lock in the healthcare benefits promised in the then current 
CBA. 
Any employee who paid attention would scoff at the idea that 
retiree healthcare benefits were anything but deferred compensation. 
Employees understood that, in contract after contract, they received 
a lower hourly wage because they were paying for retirement 
benefits, including pension and retiree healthcare. Employers often 
accounted for the cost of retiree healthcare  and pensions and retiree 
life insurance  as a separate per-employee hourly cost and shared 
that costing with the union in negotiations. Unions and employees 
typically knew exactly how much per hour that the employer took 
from their wages to pay for retiree healthcare benefits. Active 
employees saw this cost as wages they were giving up in the present 
so they would have healthcare benefits after retirement. 
Having given up this hourly amount for tens of thousands of 
hours during their employment, it is easy to understand why 
employees knew that they earned healthcare during retirement. 
And, since employers reinforced that idea prior to and at retirement, 
it is difficult to fault them for understanding that they had earned 
those benefits by working for decades at lower wages. 
As noted, stare decisis is most 
property and contract rights, where reliance interests are 
232 In both Tackett and Reese, the critical issue implicated 
both the contract rights of retired employees and reliance issues  
retirees worked for decades in reliance on long-standing, commonly-
understood promises of healthcare for themselves and their spouse 
during retirement. In this context, when the considerations 
supporting stare decisis 233 the failure of the Court 
to even identify its precedent governing these matters is 
incomprehensible. 
Tackett excoriated Yard-Man
solely on the written words of the CBA, despite the fact that Warrior 
& Gulf Navigation law of the shop which implements 
and furnishes the context of the agreement
 
232.   Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
233.   Id. 
involved." 
important "in cases involving 
are at their "acme," 
's focus on "context" rather than 
, stressed that the 11 
" was equally if not more 
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important than the written word.234  
bargaining agreement . . . are to be understood only by reference to 
Brennan stated in American Manufacturing,235 Yard-Man was right to 
look be
policy in the context of retiree healthcare benefits. 
Yard-Man 
sanctioned by Lincoln Mills. Yard-Man was an attempt to fashion 
federal law under Section 301 relating to third-party beneficiaries 
(retirees), an area that Benedict Coal had long ago held was not subject 
to the strictures of ordinary contract law, using contextual factors 
identified by Pittsburgh Plate Glass as relevant to the inquiry.236 In 
fact, Pittsburgh Plate Glass cited Benedict Coal for the proposition that 
retirees had a direct action against their former employer for breach 
of contract under Section 301 if their healthcare benefits were 
unilaterally changed.237 Thus, there is a direct line from Lincoln Mills 
to Benedict Coal to Pittsburgh Plate Glass to Yard-Man, precedent that 
Tackett entirely missed or simply ignored. 
Yard-Man 
or on other individual points, but Yard-Man was decided squarely 
within existing Supreme Court law and relied directly on that 
precedent for its holdings.238 Yard-Man was decided at a time when 
 
234.   United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960) 
(emphasis added).  
235.   United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960). 
236.   It is in this context that, in rejecting Yard-Man s analysis of the illusory  promise 
doctrine, Tackett misses the point. Yard-Man was viewing the issue from the point of the 
third-party beneficiary employee, not from the perspective of the contracting parties. If a 
retiree is a third-party beneficiary to the CBA, and has an individual contract right under 
Section 301, the issue is whether the employer s promise is illusory to that employee  not 
whether is illusory to every employee covered by the CBA. And, the employee s 
consideration is performance, that is, the decades of work performed to qualify for the 
employer s promise of retiree healthcare. See Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 
498-99 (1960); UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1480-82 (6th Cir. 1983). Under 
ordinary contract principles, [a]n illusory promise is one where the promisor is not 
obligated to do anything in consideration of  the other party s promise or performance.  
Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carey Transp., Inc., 578 F. Supp.2d 888, 921 (W.D. Mich. 2008) 
(quoting J&B Sausage Co. v. Dep t of Mgmt. & Budget, 2007 WL28409, *3 n.1 (Mich. App. 
Jan. 4, 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §77 (AM. LAW INST.), comment 
a, page 195 (1981)).  
237.   Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 180 n. 20 
(1971).  
238.   Unlike Tackett and Reese, Yard-Man cited and relied on, not only Lincoln Mills, but 
American Manufacturing, John Wiley & Sons, Transportation Employees and Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479, 1482. In his dissent to Part II of Yard-Man, addressing 
the employer s purchase of annuities, District Judge Holschuh criticized the majority for 
If "[w]ords in a collective 
the background which gave rise to their inclusion," as Justice 
yond the "ordinary rules" of contract law to fashion labor law 
was an example of the use of "judicial inventiveness" 
may have been wrong in crafting a "status" inference, 
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that precedent was still fresh and when collective bargaining was 
prevalent and relevant to the national dialogue. Tackett
rejection of Yard-Man, without understanding and analyzing  
without even identifying  the precedent on which Yard-Man was 
explicitly based, creates the suspicion that the Court intentionally 
decided to ignore its prior precedent sub rosa and start anew, 
undoing promises some 50 years after they were first made. 
Tackett and Reese rd for its earlier decisions 
establishing federal labor policy in the context of collective 
239 contract concepts to CBAs undermines any rational 
Supreme Court says or does in 
any situation at any time. If the Supreme Court can do what it did to 
retirees in Tackett and Reese, it surely can do whatever it wants, 
whenever it wants, for whatever reason it deems expedient, in any 
situation, to any citizen litigant. If stare decisis can be avoided by 
simply ignoring precedent at the whim of the Court, stare decisis is, in 
240 If this is so, then the 
Constitutional and judicial protections against arbitrary decision-
making have lost an essential common law safeguard. 
 
V. WHAT WENT WRONG 
It is unacceptable to assume that the Supreme Court of the 
United States is collectively incompetent, is collectively ignorant or 
lacks a collective memory. The Supreme Court is required to know 
its own precedent and, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to follow 
that precedent or explain why it has decided to change course. 
Because the internal processes of the Supreme Court are shrouded in 
secrecy and often are beyond the comprehension of the most 
experienced lawyers, there must be enough transparency in the 
whether it is based in reason, logic or experience.241 Otherwise, there 
 
what he saw as on over-reliance on Michigan law of accord and satisfaction, citing Lincoln 
Mills for the proposition that § 301 is governed not by state law but by federal substantive 
law  and that Lincoln Mills cautioned that courts are to utilize state law only if it is 
compatible with the purpose of § 301 and only if it is the rule that will best effectuate the 
federal policy.  Id. at 1493 (citing and quoting Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of 
Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)).   
239.   Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 160-161 (1966). 
240.   Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
241.   OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co., 1881) ( The 
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. ); SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST 
's wholesale 
's wholesale disrega 
bargaining and the unquestioning application of the "same old 
common law" 
observer's confidence in anything the 
Justice Scalia's words, "no doctrine at all." 
Court's decisions to reveal the underlying rationale of a decision 
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will be speculation that the Court acted for undisclosed reasons and 
public confidence in the judiciary will be correspondingly weakened.  
The Supreme Court currently has 36 law clerks, famously 
selected for intellectual and educational excellence honed at 
their intellectual resumes and practical legal skills is the ability to 
perform basic searches on legal databases.  If, for example, a law 
the Supreme Court, that clerk would have instantly identified, not 
only Lincoln Mills, but American Manufacturing, John Wiley & Sons, 
Transportation Employees, Bowen, DelCostello, Bildisco and Consolidated 
Rail,242 all of which stand for the proposition that CBAs are not 
ordinary contracts and are not governed by the same old rules as 
ordinary contracts. Today, if a law clerk types in the same search, 
Tackett and Reese appear as the most recent cases, both with holdings 
stating the exact opposite.243 
Tackett relied heavily on Williston, citing the treatise seven times 
244 If the Court had 
examined Williston more closely, it would have discovered that 
Williston had a separate chapter on collective bargaining 




PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, OR, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON: 
NOT THE NAME OF A LAWYER ONELY, BUT OF THE LAW ITSELFE 130 (1628) ( [Reason] is the 
life of the law. ); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235 (1944) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) ( It is difficult to believe that reason, logic or experience could be marshalled 
in support of such an assumption. ), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
242.   Boolean Search for Supreme Court Cases, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.
Default)&bhcp=1 (search (ordinary w/5 contract) & (collective w/5 bargaining) ; then 
narrow Jurisdiction  to Federal Supreme Court  cases).  
243.  The justices and their law clerks could have found all the decisions relying on Lincoln 
Mills  authorization to use judicial inventiveness  in fashioning federal labor law through 
key notes searches or Shepardization of Lincoln Mills. See Boolean Search for Supreme 
Court Cases, WESTLAW,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.
Default)&bhcp=1 (search (ordinary w/5 contract) & (collective w/5 bargaining) ; then 
narrow Jurisdiction  to Federal Supreme Court  cases; sort results by date).  
244.   The majority cited Williston five times, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 
U.S. at 435, 438, 439, 440 (twice); the concurrence twice at 443. 
245.   20 Williston on Contracts § 55.3 and notes 31, 33 (quoting Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation, 363 U.S. at 579). 
America's most elite law schools. One presumes that included in 
clerk had searched in Westlaw, using only the phrases "ordinary w /5 
contract" and "collective w/5 bargaining," and limited the search to 
for the "ordinary" rules of contract interpretation. 
, respectively, for the proposition that a CBA "'is not an 
ordinary contract," but a '"generalized code to govern a myriad of 
cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."' 
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The real issue was obscured by the thirty-year battle over the 
Yard-Man inference that came to a head in Tackett. The circuit split 
was not over the interpretation of Benedict Coal or Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation, but over the validity of the Yard-Man status inference. 
When the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari in Tackett, after 
repeatedly refusing to do so in cases decided under Yard-Man,246 
retiree lawyers understood that the Yard-Man 
probably doomed. But, they did not necessarily contemplate that the 
entire Yard-Man contract analysis, based on Lincoln Mills and using 
contract principles to fashion federal common law, would be 
obliterated as well. 
One partial explanation for the lack of focus on governing 
precedent may be the way Tackett came to the Supreme Court.  In its 
writ, M&G Polymers stated the Questions Presented as: 
1. Whether, when construing collective bargaining 
agreements in Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 
cases, courts should presume that silence concerning the 
duration of retiree health-care benefits means the parties 
intended those benefits to vest (and therefore continue 
indefinitely), as the Sixth Circuit holds; or should require a 
clear statement that health-care benefits are intended to 
survive the termination of the collective bargaining 
agreement, as the Third Circuit holds; or should require at 
least some language in the agreement that can reasonably 
support the interpretation that health-care benefits should 
continue indefinitely, as the Second and Seventh Circuits 
hold. 
2. Whether, as the Sixth Circuit has held in conflict with the 
Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, different rules of 
construction should apply when determining whether 
health-care benefits have vested in pure ERISA plans 
versus collectively bargained plans.247 
 
246.   See Moore v. Menasha Corp., 690 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 568 U.S. 1250 
(2013); Bender v. Newell Window Furnishings, Inc., 681 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied 
568 U.S. 943 (2012); Rose v. Volvo Const. Equip. N. Am., Inc., 331 Fed. Appx. 388 (6th Cir. 
2009), cert. denied 559 U.S. 970 (2010); Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571 
(6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1019 (2006); UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 
768 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1067 (2000); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 
648 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 807 (1996); Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 
F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1007 (1984). 
247.   Petition for Writ of Certiorari, M&G Polymers USA, LLC. v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 
(2015) (No. 13-1010). The Court limited its grant of certiorari to Question 1, M&G Polymers 
USA, LLC. v. Tackett, 572 U.S. 1099 (2014). But the second issue impacted the briefs, 
"status inference" was 
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This statement skews the discussion in a manner that deflects 
attention from the real issue  whether CBAs are ordinary contracts 
that are governed by the same common law rules as ordinary 
contracts.  If the real issue had been stated in the first question, the 
Court and the parties would have focused on the precedent 
addressing that issue, and under existing precedent, the answer to 
the second issue would have been apparent  different rules do apply 
to collectively bargained plans. 
In Tackett, M&G Polymers and its supporting amici, including 
the Chamber of Commerce and the American Manufacturing 
Association, sought, not only the demise of the Yard-Man inference, 
es could win only if 
248 They noted that the Sixth Circuit, 
in Sprague v. General Motors Corp.,249 had applied such a rule under 
ERISA to non-CBA retiree healthcare contracts.250 This line of attack 
on Yard-Man understandably influenced the response. In their brief, 
the Tackett Respondents rejected the way the Petitioner had framed 
the Question Presente
contrary to federal labor policy. Instead, they argued: 
The answer to the question presented, thus framed as 
whether the courts should follow alternative A, B, or C, is 
 has the virtues of 
being both simpler and legally correct: to interpret 
promises of this character through the traditional 
principles of contract interpretation, just as the courts 
interpret all other promises in CBAs.251 
The Tackett Respondents cited John Wiley & Sons for the 
passing.252  They included a parenthetical quote from American 
Manufacturing 
which collective bargaining agreements are negotiated and the 
253 Respondents cited 
 
argument and the Court s opinion. 
248.   Brief for the Petitioner, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010) [hereinafter 
Petitioner s Brief].  
249.   Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).  
250.   Brief for National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 16-17, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  
251. Brief of Respondent at 19, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010) [hereinafter 
Respondents  Brief].  
252.   Id. at 20 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964)).  
253.   Id. at 20 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960)).  
but a "clear statement'' rule under which retire 
the written CBA clearly and unambiguously provided for "lifetime" 
or "vested" healthcare benefits. 
d, but not because Petitioner's approach was 
"No." There is a fourth alternative, which
proposition that a CBA "is 'not an ordinary contract,111 but only in 
that "[S]pecial heed should be given to the context in 
purpose they are intended to serve." 
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Consolidated Rail only for the proposition that CBAs contain both 
standard would delegate implied CBA ter
status.254 Ironically, Respondents cited Transportation Employees for 
255 rather than for the 
actual holding of Transportat
common- 256 
Respondents did not cite Warrior & Gulf Navigation or argue that 
- the practices of the industry and the 
shop - is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement 
257 
In their brief and at oral argument, Tackett
defend the Yard-Man inference.258  Instead, at oral argument, Tackett
counsel stated that the retirees would welcome a remand and would 
prevail under ordinary contract principles, without reliance on any 
Yard-Man inference.259 
This author was also concerned that the Court might adopt the 
rule. As a result, he filed an 
amicus brief on behalf of certain Retiree Committees formed in 
connection with the settlement of the Yolton, Golden and Fox 
litigation.260  
was inconsistent even with ordinary rules of contract interpretation, 
and argued that those ordinary rules are aimed at determining the 
actual intent of the parties and often require courts to look beyond 
the written agreement, even when the language may appear to be 
unambiguous.261 
was also contrary to federal labor law, citing the Steelworker Trilogy 
 
254.   Id. at 22, (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives  Ass n, 491 U.S. 299, 
308-309 (1989).  
255.   Id. at 39.  
256.   Transp.-Commc n Emp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1966). 
257.   See generally Respondents  Brief, supra notes 246-249; United Steelworkers v. Warrior 
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).  
258.   In its reply, the petitioner stated that [R]espondents try to put as much distance as 
they can between Yard-Man and the judgment in this case.  Reply Brief for Petitioners at 
1, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  
259.   Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, 41, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427(2015) (No. 13 1010).   
260.   See Brief for Fox Retiree Committee et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  
261.   Id. at 7-11. 
"express and implied terms" and that imposing a "clear and patent" 
ms to a "less favored" 
the proposition that "traditional rules [of contract interpretation] 
apply fully to the interpretation of CBAs," 
ion Employees that a CBA is "not an 
ordinary contract" and is not governed by the "same old 
law concepts which control such private contracts." 
"industrial common law 
although not expressed in it." 
employer's proposed "clear statement'' 
's counsel did not 
's 
In that brief, this author stressed a "clear statement'' rule 
In the process, this author noted that a "clear statement'' rule 
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for that proposition.262 The author cited both Lincoln Mills and 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation for the principle that CBAs are negotiated 
in unique circumstances and assessed in the broader context of 
federal labor policy.263 
American Manufacturing t
only by reference to the background which gave rise to their 
264 But the focus of the amicus brief was intentionally on 
265 
In another amicus brief supporting the Tackett retirees,266 the 
Labor and Benefits Law Professors cited Groover v. Michelin North 
America, Inc.,267 where retirees sued to enforce their collectively-
bargained right to lifetime healthcare benefits.268  In Groover, the 
district court cited Transportation Employees 
collective bargaining agreement, however, is not governed by the 
same principles of interpretation as those that apply to private or 
269 The district court held that federal labor 
270 
briefs to discover its precedent. As noted above, Yard-Man itself cited 
not only Lincoln Mills, but John Wiley & Sons, Transportation 
Employees, and American 
Manufacturing about how collective bargaining agreements are 
different from ordinary contracts.271 Yard-Man cited and relied 
expressly on Pittsburgh Plate Glass for its contextual analysis.272 In his 
dissent to Part II of Yard-Man, District Judge Holschuh cited Lincoln 
Mills 
[CBAs] under § 301 is governed not by state law but by federal 
 
262.   Id. at 2. 
263.   Id. at 4-5, 8. 
264.   Id. at 8. 
265.   See Brief for Fox Retiree Committee et al. as Amici Curiae for the Respondents, 
Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  
266.   Brief of Labor and Benefits Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  
267.   Id. at 6, n.3. 
268.   Groover v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (M.D. Ala. 2000).  
269.   Id. at 1247. 
270.   Id.  
271.   UAW v. Yard-Man Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983), abrogated by M&G 
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015). 
272.   Id. at 1482. 
inclusion." 
He quoted Justice Brennan's concurrence in 
hat words in a CBA "can be understood 
"ordinary" contract principles rather than federal labor policy. 
for the principle that "[a] 
commercial contracts." 
policy provided "considerably more latitude in considering extrinsic 
evidence," not offered under ordinary contract law, in determining 
the parties' contractual intent. 
The Supreme Court did not have to rely solely on the parties' 
Justice Brennan's concurrence in 
for the principle that "it is well settled that the enforcement of 
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273 
None of this mattered. Yard-Man had to go. But, Yard-Man met 
its demise in Tackett without any reference to the Supreme Court 
precedent that informed Yard-Man.274 In the process, the federal 
common law of Section 301, fashioned by reference to federal labor 
275 
Precedent developed over decades was ignored. 
In the post-Tackett appeal in Reese
arguments to the Sixth Circuit was that Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
required consideration of the common law of the shop as part of the 
CBA.276 Both the majority and dissent ignored that argument.  In its 
per curiam decision, the Supreme Court summarily denied the Reese 
retirees any opportunity to address pre-Tackett precedent on the 
merits.277 In a stunning departure from pre-Tackett precedent, Reese 
278 
In hindsight, retiree advocates may have made what now 
appear to be tactical misjudgments, in avoiding a full-throated 
defense of Yard-Man and in not providing a more detailed and 
vigorous discussion of federal labor policy and of Benedict Coal, 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation and their progeny.  But, counsel for the 
retirees in Tackett had a duty only to their clients  not retirees in 
general  and the Tackett retirees survived to fight another day.279 The 
Court cannot rely on the parties to identify either the relevant issues 
or the relevant precedent. The Supreme Court has broader duties 
than to resolve any individual dispute; the Supreme Court owes 
fidelity to the rule of law in general and to its precedent.280 Given the 
 
273.   Id. at 1493 (Holschuh, J. dissenting). 
274.   This was the same precedent that had informed those employers who agreed in the 
late-1960 s to provide healthcare benefits for retirees after the implementation of Medicare 
had made it both inexpensive for them and desirable to employees. See generally Brief of 
Labor and Benefits Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Tackett, 
574 U.S. 427 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  
275.   Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.  
276.   See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 25-31, Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., 854 F.3d 877 (6th 
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2382).  
277.   CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 766-67 (2018).  
278.   Id. at 763. 
279.   Instead, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit. M&G Polymers 
USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 442 (2015). The Sixth Circuit in turn remanded the case 
to the district court for a determination of whether the healthcare benefits vested under 
ordinary principles of contract law. Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 811 F.3d 204, 210 
(6th Cir. 2015). 
280.  The impact of Tackett and Reese was immediate and devastating. Thousands of retirees 
substantive law." 
policy, was entirely displaced by "ordinary contract principles." 
, one of the retirees' principal 
held that the Court had "long held" that CBAs "must" be interpreted 
"'according to ordinary principles of contract law .111 
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circumstances at the time  
 it is absurd to think that a different response from 
the Tackett retirees or other amici would have made any difference, 
particularly after Reese. 
In Tackett and Reese, the Supreme Court, the ultimate guardian 
of the law, reversed long-established precedent sub silentio,281 and did 
so apparently intentionally.  This is difficult to comprehend and 
impossible to justify. 
VI. A WHOLE NEW BALL GAME 
seminal labor law decisions were issued.  Globalization and 
technology have changed the American industrial workplace 
forever.  Union membership has plummeted.282 Michigan, once the 
powerhouse, is now the heart of the rust belt.283 
Republican governor and Republican controlled legislature, the 
result of gerrymandered legislative districts, turned the home of the 
UAW into a Right to Work state.284 
As a nation, what was long an industrial economy has become 
largely a service economy.285 It is the exception rather than the norm 
for any worker to be employed by a single employer throughout a 
 
and their spouses lost their healthcare benefits as a result. See supra, note 202. 
281.  Defined as Under silence; without notice being taken; without being expressly 
mentioned (such as precedent sub silentio).  Sub Silentio, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. Post 2014).  
282.   The percentage of unionized workforce peaked in 1954 at about 35%. GERALD 
MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES CRS-11, Figure 1 & CRS-12 
(2004).  In 1983, it was 20.1 %, but by 2017 had fallen to 10.7%. Press Release, U.S. DEP T. 
OF LABOR, Union Members  2017 (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01192018.pdf.  
283.   In Michigan, the unionized work force fell from 44.8% in 1964 to 14.7% in 2014. 
Quoctrung Bui, 50 Years of Shrinking Union Membership, One Map, NPR (Feb. 23, 2015),  
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/23/385843576/50-years-of-shrinking-union-
membership-in-one-map (When using the interactive map, adjust slider to 1964 and 2014 
to see cited statistics).  
284.   See Mich. Comp. Law Ann. §423.17 (West 2019); Mich. Comp. Law Ann. 
§423.209(2) (West 2019). 
285.   Reid Wilson, Watch the U.S. Transition from a Manufacturing Economy to a Service 




- the employer's push for a "clear 
statement" rule -
Much has changed since the 1960's and 1970's, when the 
arsenal of democracy and the heart of America's industrial 
In 2013, Michigan's 
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career.286 As the nature of the workplace has changed, the 
have assumed greater significance and employer-sponsored 
healthcare has declined.287 
In the present economy, employers increasingly hire 
who often work alongside existing employees, doing the same tasks. 
In the emerging gig economy, companies like Uber and Lyft have 
while using their own equipment and paying their own expenses.288 
Naturally, the owners of rideshare companies become billionaires 
while the price of taxi medallions plummet.289 
Well-meaning, well-educated elites offer ideas on how to 
address the lack of collective power of lower and middle class 
290 Collective bargaining to address this imbalance in 
power is seen as  and as currently structured may well be  an 
outmoded means of redress for the grievances of any worker (or any 
 
Add to this the inexorable rise in the cost of healthcare,291 in 
 
286.   Press Release, U.S. DEP T OF LABOR, Employee Tenure in 2018 (Sep. 20, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm. 
287.   See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §1181 
(2012).   




289.   See Nicole Goodkind, NYC Taxi Drivers are Killing Themselves, and Some Blame Uber 
and Lyft, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.newsweek.com/uber-lyft-taxi-drivers-suicide-new-york-city-866994. ( A 
taxi medallion, which allows a driver to operate his or her own cab instead of leasing 
from others, peaked at $1 million in 2014 but is now worth less than $200,000. ) 
290.   Sharon Block and Benjamin Sachs, This Labor Day, A Clean Slate for Reform, ON 
LABOR (Sept. 3, 2018), https://onlabor.org/this-labor-day-a-clean-slate-for-reform; See also 
Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L. J. 1, 2 (2016); Jay Youngdahl, Harvard Wants 
to Save the Working Class, JACOBIN (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/10/clean-slate-labor-law-unions-janus.  
291.   According to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), U.S. healthcare 
spending in 2017 was $10,739 per person, or $3.5 trillion nationally, or 17.9% of Gross 
Domestic Product. CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., Historical, 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Report
"portability and continuity" of healthcare benefits from job to job 
individuals as "independent contractors" rather than employees. 
Employers often provide fewer or no benefits to these II contractors" 
"partners" rather than employees. These partners have the 
"freedom" to work odd and long hours for low pay and no benefits 
workers by, for example, "crea[ting] a new labor movement'' from a 
"clean slate." 
"partner" or "independent contractor" or "colleague" or "associate" 
or "intern").
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large part because private employers and government footed the bill 
for so long  at the prodding of unions who sought benefit 
improvements in every set of negotiations until the balance of power 
tipped against them. During and beyond this era of healthcare 
expansion, the private sector rushed to capitalize on the healthcare 
market: insurance companies, drug companies, pharmacy benefit 
managers, third-party administrators and layers of consultants, 
many owned by private equity companies, all sought a larger piece 
of the healthcare pie through mergers and acquisitions,292 marketing 
directed at consumers293 and physicians,294 more new (or newer 
versions of) medical procedures, prescription drugs and products for 
existing and newly identified ailments, and, of course, outright 
fraud.295  The wages of healthcare and pharma CEOs have soared  
whether or not profits did.296 
Tension between rising provider income, on the one hand, and 
attempts to control costs, on the other, has led to even more layers of 
administration and administrative costs. Insurance providers offer 
managed care or preferred provider plans intended to reduce costs 
ho accept 
consultants offer healthcare providers services, for example, that 
297  In turn, other c -
 
s/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last visited May 
14, 2019). In 1960, the healthcare cost per person was $146 per person, or $27.2 billion total, 
for 5% of GDP. Id.  
292.  Kelly Gooch, Healthcare Mergers and Acquisitions: 6 Things to Know, BECKER S HOSP. 
REVIEW (July 23, 2018),  
https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-and-valuation/healthcare-
mergers-and-acquisitions-6-things-to-know.html.  
293.   Rebecca Robbins, Drug Makers now spend $5 billion a year on advertising. Here s what 
that buys., STAT NEWS (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/09/drug-industry-advertising/.  
294.   Ana Swanson, Big pharmaceutical companies are spending far more on marketing than 
research, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2015),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/11/big-pharmaceutical-comp
anies-are-spending-far-more-on-marketing-than-research/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e7
7104ae04a1.   
295.   Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical industry gets high on fat profits, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223. 
296.   Elizabeth Whitman, Healthcare and Pharma CEOs Paid More than Top Execs in Any 
Other Industry, Analysis Finds, INT L BUS. TIMES (May 25, 2016), 
https://www.ibtimes.com/healthcare-pharma-ceos-paid-more-top-execs-any-other-indust
ry-analysis-finds-2374013 
297.   BRAULT, Practice Solutions for Acute and Emergency Groups,
by encouraging participants to use "network" providers w 
the "network" contract amount for their services. To counter this, 
"defend your clinical decisions and capture proper compensation for 
every billable service." ompanies offer "re pricing'' 
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-
submitted by doctors and hospitals outside the particular 
298 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers like Express Scripts, Optum, and 
Caremark offer programs to plan sponsors intended to reduce the 
costs of prescription drugs.299  Other consultants offer services 
intended to gain bargaining leverage for plan sponsors and their 
participants in negotiations with these PBMs.300 The continued 
tension between soaring healthcare costs and attempts to manage 
those costs adds layer after layer to the healthcare morass. 
In this scenario, virtually no employer now offers retiree 
healthcare for new employees; very few employers provide full 
healthcare benefits for any employees.  The trend has long been to 





bd3228 (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).  
298.   See e.g., H.H.C GROUP, Claims Negotiation and Repricing, 
http://www.hhcgroup.com/claims-negotiation-and-repricing/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) 
( HHC has established relationships with major national, regional, and local preferred 
provider networks (PPOs). When our clients submit out-of-network claims, we can often 
reprice the claims to the significantly lower, pre-negotiated rates which providers in 
these networks have already agreed. )  
299.   Over the Years, PBMs, which were not a major force until the late 1980 s, have 
since grown exponentially. By 2016, 266 million Americans were in plans administered 
by PBMs. PBMs save cost by, inter alia, negotiating rebates from drug manufacturers and 
discounts from pharmacies; implementing plants with tiers  of drugs based on the drug 
costs to steer participants to lower cost alternatives; implement mail order  programs; 
and offering a wide variety of the utilization management  programs, including prior 
authorization,  step therapy,  and quantity/duration  reviews. See PHARM. CARE 
MGMT. ASS N, Our Mission, https://www.pcmanet.org/our-industry/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2019). Beginning in 2014, PBMs like Express Scripts and Caremark implement drug 
exclusions  for a wide variety of drugs as part of their national formulary, offering 
alternative drugs that were intended to be clinical  equivalents. See Thomas Reinke, 
PBMs Just Say No to Some Drugs- But Not to Others, MANAGED CARE MAGAZINE (Apr. 5, 
2015), 
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2015/4/pbms-just-say-no-some-drugs-not-o
thers. In the process, PBMS have become behemoths. As of 2018, Express Scripts was the 
25th largest company in the United States with $100 billion in sales and $4.5 billion in net 
income. Express Scripts is also in the process of being acquired by the insurer CIGNA for 
a proposed $54 billion. See FORTUNE 500, The Fortune 500, 
http://fortune.com/fortune500/express-scripts-holding/ (last visited May 14, 2019).  
300.   For example, the Keenan Pharmacy Purchasing Coalition delivers cost savings and 
advance prescription management  through negotiating strength  to leverage volume 
discount pricing and the most generous manufacturer drug rebates.  See KEENAN, 
Pharmacy Serviceshttps://www.keenan.com/Solutions/EmployeeBenefits/Pharmacy-
Services (last visited May 14, 2019).  
services to negotiate and reduce, for a fee, "non network" claims 
"network. 
is available to new hires. "Legacy" liabilities for employees long 
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since retired is something that to employers, especially if they have 
purchased that liability in an acquisition, seems unnecessarily and 
unfairly burdensome to the bottom line. After Tackett and Reese, they 
have little reason for any further anxiety about the legacy of those 
retirees who earned healthcare benefits by relying on what the 
employer told them when they were earning them.  The legacy of 
Tackett and Reese is that even those employers who always 
understood the nature of their obligation to retirees now have a clear 
roadmap to escape that obligation. 
Tackett and Reese were decided in the context of present-day 
realities. But, the promises were not made in the most recent CBA  
they were made decades ago.  In reliance on those promises, 
employees worked for decades to earn what they were promised.  
No court can determine the meaning of a promise made in collective 
bargaining in 1970 without first understanding what the CBA 
actually is. No court can determine what the parties intended in 1970 
promise in 1970. 
By failing to cite Warrior & Gulf Navigation and long-established 
principles regarding the fundamental nature of labor agreements 
and federal labor policy, the Supreme Court relegated decades of the 
crucially relevant evidence of how the parties themselves viewed 
their contractual obligations  
301 
 to the judicial dust heap. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice Roberts has stressed that his responsibility, and 
now where home 
plate is located. Without stare decisis
302 
During the forty years I have practiced in federal courts, each 
new Supreme Court nominee has promised fealty to the ideal of 
impartiality  that he or she would impartially decide cases based on 
fidelity to precedent rather than personal ideology.  Each nominee 
 
301.   United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).  
302.   Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 683, 
685-86 (2016). 
except "by reference to the background which gave rise" to the 
- evidence that was "equally a part of 
the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it" 
that of all Supreme Court Justices, is to simply call "balls and 
strikes," regardless of their personal predilections. But, the Justices 
cannot call "balls and strikes" fairly if they do not k 
, the Supreme Court is "making 
up the strike zone as [it] goes along." 
has been questioned on his or her view of the validity of "precedent'' 
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and each has pledged  for reasons entirely unrelated to any concern 
for the rights of retirees  
the lessons of experience and history. 
In the most recent confirmation, stare decisis took center stage. 
Some Senators apparently felt comfortable enough with Judge 
K Roe v. Wade303 
vote for his confirmation as Justice, despite his earlier advice not to 
refer to Roe v. Wade 304 And, 
in his confirmation proceedings, Mr. Kavanaugh referenced his 
statement in a 2016 law review article that United States v. Nixon305 
306 to 
decided  307 As Paul Simon wrote: 
308 
I expect that many of the retirees I represented in Reese, whose 
lives may be shattered by the loss of the benefits they worked so hard 
to earn, most of whom still live in Wisconsin and Iowa, voted for a 
President whose principal success so far is to appoint only judges 
carefully vetted by interest groups who zealously advocated for that 
loss.309 I know that there are retirees who blame the UAW, not the 
courts, for this injury. 
Stare decisis assumes an even more critical role in times like this 
when partisan fever  and fundamental disagreements about the 
 
303.   Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
304.   See Robert Barnes and Michael Kranish, Kavanaugh Advised Against Calling Roe v. 




305.   United States v. Nixon, 415 U.S. 683 (1974). 
306.   Kavanaugh, supra note 296, at 688. 
307.   See Greg Stohr, Kavanaugh Once Thought the Supreme Court s Nixon Decision Might be 
Erroneous , TIME (July 22, 2018), http://time.com/5345351/trump-supreme-court-brett-
cavanaugh-nixon/  
308.   PAUL F. SIMON, The Boxer, on BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS: THE ALBUM 
(Columbia Records 1969).  
309.   This is not to say that the four Democratic  Justices protected retiree contract rights 
or protested the failure of stare decisis. They failed as miserably as the five Republican  
judges in Tackett and Reese in identifying governing precedent. The best they could do in 
their Tackett concurrence was to note and correct a few of the majority s major omissions 
about Litton and ordinary  contract law principles. See M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. 
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 936 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In Reese, when adherence to 
ordinary contract law became mandatory, they were agonizingly silent. See generally CNH 
Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018).  
- to honor the Court's existing precedent and 
avanaugh' s characterization of as "settled" law to 
as the "settled law of the land" in 2003. 
was one of the II greatest moments in American judicial history," 
counter his 1999 statements that "maybe Nixon was wrongly 
- heresy though it is to say so." 
"Such are promises, all lies and jests, still a man hears what he wants 
to hear and disregards the rest." 
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validity of prominent precedent  are acute.  Ironically, in such times, 
when justices are selected for their views on particularly divisive 
issues and then claim, for example, that their confirmation hearings 
 310 
311 by the opposing party, the Constitutional tenure protection  
intended to assure judicial independence  may instead be the means 
for perpetuating existing bias.  In this scenario, the Supreme Court 
must even more scrupulously adhere to the principles underlying 
stare decisis to assure a modicum of impartiality in the judicial 
decision-making process. 
What happened in Tackett and Reese would not happen if the 
issue were abortion rights or the authority of the special counsel to 
subpoena the President. In such cases, no litigant, judge or Justice 
could possibly ignore Roe v. Wade or United States v. Nixon.  In the 
current climate, long-established federal labor law policies and the 
income security of tens of thousands of retirees can pass below the 
radar of judges and lawyers, as well as most Americans.312 But, given 
the importance of stare decisis as a check against a biased judiciary, 
what happened in Tackett and Reese cannot be ignored.  We must 
closely examine whenever and wherever the law ends, especially if, 
as John Locke cautioned, that is where tyranny begins.313 
 
310.   Hearing on the Senate Judiciary Committee of the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the 
Supreme Court, 102nd Cong. (Oct. 11, 1991).  
311.   Hearing on the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court, 115th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/nomination-of-the-honorable-brett-m-
kavanaugh-to-be-an-associate-justice-of-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states-day-5.  
312.   None of the law review articles or case commentary the author reviewed on Tackett 
and Reese noted their failure to cite or follow Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g. Spencer 
Cook, The Supreme Court of the United States held that courts shall interpret Welfare plans in 
employee collective- bargaining agreements using ordinary principles of contract law, 17 
TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE J. BUS. L. 197 (2015); Robert A. Hillman, The Supreme Court s 
Application of Ordinary Contract Principles  to the Issue of the Duration of Retiree Healthcare 
Benefits: Perpetuating the Interpretation/Gap-Filling Quagmire, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299 
(2017); Maria O Brien Hylton, After Tackett: Incomplete Contracts for Post-Retirement 
Healthcare, 36 PACE L. REV. 317 (2016); Bruce Levine, Labor & Employment Law, 66 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1027, 1069 (2016); Tex Pasley, Ordinary Principles of Contract Interpretation v. 
Ordinary Principles of Contract Interpretation: The Future of Retiree Healthcare Benefits After 
M&G Polymers v. Tackett, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL Y & L. 125 (2017).  
313.   John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, Book 2, Chapter XVIII, §202, (Hollis ed. 
1689) ( Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another s harm; 
and whoever in authority exceeds the power  given him by the law, and makes use of the 
force he has under his command to compass that upon the subject which the law allows 
not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; . . ). 
constitute a "high tech lynching" or an "orchestrated political 
hit'' 
